Cross-Party Public Bill Committee
The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill has passed another stage of scrutiny; the cross-party Public Bill Committee of 20 MPs ended their detailed consideration of the Government's proposals on February 17 2011. Find out what changed were agreed here, and track the progress of the Bill here.
Second Reading of the Police Reform and Social Responsiblity Bill
The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill passed its second reading in the House of Commons on Monday 13 December and will now be considered in detail by a cross party Public Bill Committee of 20 Members of Parliament between January 18 and February 18 2011.
The Commons Bill Committee invited the public to write in and give their views on the Bill in advance of their considerations.
Response to Policing in the 21st century: Reconnecting Police and the People
You can read North Wales Police Authority's response below to “Policing in the 21st Century: Reconnecting the police and the people”
13 September 2010
North Wales Police Authority wishes to register its serious concerns with the shortened consultation period on the policing reform paper, which is against the government’s Code of Practice on consultation. This states that consultations should normally last for at least 12 weeks with consideration given to longer timescales where feasible and sensible. Eight weeks which includes the summer holidays is inadequate for such an important consultation.
We have divided our response into 2 main sections:
· Proposals for an improved accountability model
· Responses to the consultation questions set by the Home Office
Section 1: Proposals for an improved accountability model
1) North Wales Police Authority has serious concerns regarding the Government's proposed model of police accountability. We recognise that there is room for improvement and we are open to change, but we believe that changes should be focused on ensuring high quality, accountable policing, with the involvement of a wide range of stakeholders in agreeing policing priorities and agree that this is best achieved through governance arrangements which promote a consensual, involving approach with appropriate safeguards.
2) We believe that the Government’s objective (making the police more accountable through oversight by a directly elected individual, subject to strict checks and balances by locally elected representatives) would be much better achieved by adopting the same type of model as is used in business, where even with a very publicly identifiable Chair and Chief Executive, there are also non-executive directors as part of a single Board, which is jointly responsible for governance.
3) Whereas the Government’s proposed model assumes conflict between the Commissioner and other members with a role in Governance, this model would encourage consensus-building and would be much more likely to achieve the appropriate balance between supporting the Commissioner in his or her role and challenging him or her.
4) The appointment process for members of the Board sitting alongside the Commissioner should be “Nolan compliant” :
· Overriding principle of appointment on merit
· Selection on merit should take account of the need to appoint boards which include a balance of skills and backgrounds. The basis on which members are appointed and how they are expected to fulfil their role should be explicit. The range of skills and background which are sought should be clearly specified.
· All appointments should be made after advice from a panel or committee which includes an independent element.
· Each panel or committee should have at least one independent member and independent members should normally account for at least a third of membership.
5) Within these principles, it would be possible for the Commissioner to be involved in the appointments (but not as sole arbiter), to ensure that the Panel includes representatives of each of the local authorities in the area (in North Wales, 6) and that such representation is politically balanced, as well as including independent members.
6) Given that the Commissioner will be elected, they will need to be able to over-ride the rest of the Board – but this could be written into a dispute resolution process as currently exists between an elected Mayor and a Council. Such a procedure means a conflict is publicly embarrassing as well as causing a delay – so generally everyone tries to reach a consensus.
Section 2: Responses to the consultation questions set by the Home Office
Key proposals in Chapter 2:
- Police Authorities to be abolished and replaced with a single directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) for each force
- The Commissioner will hold the Chief Constable to account for the full range of their current responsibilities (including national issues), and Chief Constables will have greater professional freedom to take operational decisions to meet the priorities set for them by the Commissioner
- Appropriate checks and balances to the power of PCCs will be provided by a Police and Crime Panel in each force area drawn from elected councillors and independent and lay members
Questions on Chapter 2:
1. Will the proposed checks and balances set out in this Chapter provide effective but un-bureaucratic safeguards for the work of Commissioners, and are there further safeguards that should be considered?
1.1 We do not believe that the proposed checks and balances set out in this Chapter provide effective but un-bureaucratic safeguards for the work of Commissioners. As set out in Section One above, we believe that an alternative model would be much more effective. This alternative model is based on having a single Board which includes the Commissioner and other members.
1.2 The lack of detail within the consultation paper is a significant issue which makes providing a constructive response more challenging, as the information provided raises more questions than it provides answers.
1.3 It is difficult to see how the proposed new model meets the principles of good governance produced by the Independent Commission on Good Governance in Public Services[1]:
(1) Focus on the organisation’s purpose and on outcomes for citizens and service users
(2) Perform effectively in clearly defined functions and roles
(3) Promote values for the whole organisation and demonstrate the values of good governance through behaviour
(4) Take informed, transparent decisions and manage risk
(5) Develop the capacity and capability of the governing body to be effective
(6) Engage stakeholders and make accountability real
1.4 Intrinsic to the proposals is a confrontational approach which could have a negative effect on the public’s trust in the service and potentially destabilise policing. This danger could be averted by giving the Commissioner and Panel Members joint responsibility for setting priorities and scrutinising the performance of the Force.
1.5 The suggestion of a referendum in case of opposition by the Panel to the Commissioner’s proposals is not workable in terms of extra cost or the timescales required to set both precept and Council Tax. What is needed is a mechanism whereby different views can be reconciled rather than a “nuclear option” with totally disproportionate costs.
1.6 We agree with the commitment to protect the operational independence afforded to Chief Constables, however clear guidance will need to be issued to aid both the Force and the Commissioner to interpret where the boundaries lie, especially as it would appear there is an intention for it to move. The relationship between the Chief Constable and the Commissioner will be key to the success (or otherwise) of these proposed arrangements and lack of clarity can only cause damage.
1.7 We agree that the Commissioner will need support – and that the detail of arrangements should be determined locally. But clear ground rules are required. A professional, politically neutral chief executive and officer team is essential, including a treasurer who is financially qualified. We do not believe it would be appropriate to allow the Commissioner to make political appointments. If the Government does want to go down this road, it should at least ensure that the process conforms with existing legislation around assistants to political groups and elected Mayors. If the Commissioner is to have the option of appointing one or more Deputy Commissioners, then clear rules are required, distinct from the appointment of staff. Remuneration of senior officers and all political appointees should be published.
1.8 The electoral process does not in itself provide an adequate performance framework for a Commissioner. In real terms an individual could be a Commissioner for eight years with only one electoral assessment of performance – after four years. While the criminal justice system may be adequate to deal with outright corruption, processes need to be in place to deal with lesser problems such as undue interference in operational matters, inappropriate behaviour or incapacity to act. Chief Constables and/or Police and Crime Panels should be able to refer complaints against Commissioners to the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) which should have the power to issue reprimands and if necessary remove the Commissioner from office. In relation to existing elected posts, the requirement for collective responsibility provides a safety valve for dealing with problems – as drafted, the Government’s proposals do not.
1.9 We are told that Ministers are determined that Police Authorities “cannot continue”. Regardless of the composition of the new arrangements or the names used, it is important that there is continuity and that the new arrangements include some form of corporate body. All police properties are held in the name of the Police Authority and all contracts are entered into by the Police Authority as a body corporate. If the Force becomes a body corporate instead of the Commissioner or Panel, their ability to set the framework within which the Chief Constable operates will be limited. Numerous other statutory responsibilities which sit with Police Authorities and duties outlined in previous Home Office Circulars will need to be resolved and clear guidance issued to Authorities to aid in the transition.
2. What could be done to ensure that candidates for Commissioner come from a wide range of backgrounds, including from party political and independent standpoints?
2.1 Equality and Diversity matters have been important for the policing service and police Authorities over the past decade. Police Authorities have added significant value to the movement forward within the policing service since the Macpherson report. The value that a diverse workforce can bring to the service has been highlighted, and equally the value that a diverse Authority can bring in scrutinising the Police from different perspectives, gained through different socialisation experiences has been demonstrated, either directly through the Authority or in partnership with Independent Advisory Groups (IAG).
2.2 North Wales Police Authority’s 17 members have recognised their limits in being able to call themselves truly representative of a diverse area such as North Wales, in terms of ethnicity, culture, age, gender, disability, geographical location, sexuality, religion and language. If 17 members find it challenging to represent the diverse views and experience, one commissioner, although democratically elected, will encounter much greater difficulty.
2.3 This is all the more reason to emphasise the need for diversity in the composition of the proposed Crime and Policing Panel – and to ensure that it has a substantive role in governance. It will also be necessary to have a well-developed structure of community consultation (see question 3).
2.4 The following issues are not addressed by the consultation document but will have a significant bearing on whether candidates from a wide range of backgrounds feel able to stand for election:
· The ‘cost’ of becoming a candidate – deposit, cost and time commitment involved in campaigning and funding regulations
· Detailed information about the role and responsibilities of a Commissioner
· Financial Remuneration and time commitment for the Commissioner
2.5 The elections will be expensive, particularly if they are on a different timescale to other elections. The Local Government Association (LGA) has estimated the cost at £50million. It will be appropriate to limit the cost by holding the elections to coincide with other elections and for there to be a booklet informing electors of the policies and background of each candidate (as in mayoral elections). It is essential that the Government provides for these costs so as to limit the impact on frontline policing.
2.6 The challenges of ensuring diverse democratic representation have been illustrated at all levels of British democracy and it must be recognised that the scale of the electorate involved and the physical area covered in areas such as North Wales create a significant barrier to independent candidates seeking election. We question the public appetite for more elections. We already have five tiers of elections: Town/Community Council, Unitary Authority, Welsh Assembly, British and European Parliaments. Public turnout rates for these are low. If the proposal is introduced, it could result in candidates being elected based on single issues or even provide an opportunity for extremist views to have an influence over local policing.
2.7 From experience we recognise and anticipate the need for Commissioners to be appropriately briefed about a range of sensitive policing issues and would suggest that consideration should be given to an appropriate mechanism for vetting candidates. The criteria for disqualification from being a member of a police authority should apply to commissioners as well and even if there is reluctance to have a full positive vetting process, consideration should be given to a mechanism to confirm to members of the public whether a candidate (or a potential candidate) would be disqualified from standing so as to ensure that the candidates selected by political parties (or supported as independent candidates) and to ensure that any relevant information is placed in the public domain if an individual decides to pursue his or her candidacy. This would avoid the potential considerable difficulties post-election. Consideration should also be given to which conflicts of interests would bar a candidate from standing and how such conflicts are to be managed after the election. A member of the police authority who has a commercial interest (or a close friend or relative with a commercial interest) can ensure that they do not participate in decisions where there could be a conflict of interest. How would a commissioner manage such a situation if there is no other person who can take the decision in their place?
3. How should Commissioners best work with the wider criminal justice and community safety partners who deliver the broad range of services that keep communities safe?
3.1 The Police cannot tackle crime and disorder alone. If the changes are to have a long term impact on crime in on our communities, effective engagement and partnerships with other agencies must be achieved. In Wales the Assembly have responsibility for Community Safety Partnerships and the associated arrangements.
3.2 We support a role for the Commissioner within the wider criminal justice sector, and we suggest that accountability arrangements within other sectors of the criminal justice system are reviewed and given equal attention to policing.
3.3 We welcome the proposals for a strategic level partnership, to ensure greater consistency and best practice across local authority areas.
3.4 In the coming challenging financial times, collaboration between police forces and across public services will be vital to secure greater efficiency savings. There must be a clear duty for the Commissioner to encourage and scrutinise collaboration. We would also advocate that similar statutory guidance is issued to other organisations.
3.5 The demands that will be placed on the Commissioner in fulfilling all of these roles will be substantial. It is a challenge at present for the 17 members to fulfil effectively all of the partnership commitments. The number of meetings associated with each CSP (6 in North Wales), their sub-groups (e.g. Substance Misuse Action Teams, Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements) should not be underestimated. These responsibilities do not just mean attendance at meetings; the commitment by the Commissioner will need to go much further to ensure effective partnership arrangements.
3.6 A further challenge for the Commissioner will be the level of professional knowledge and language they will find themselves immersed in. Members of our Authority have stated that they take a minimum of six months to become familiar with the workings of the Force, which is in itself a complex multi-million pound business, the service delivery mechanisms, the threats and risks and other key foundation knowledge. We encourage our members to specialise in a particular area to not only maximise the benefit of their previous experience, but also to ensure that the work load is manageable. No prior experience or qualifications will be expected of a Commissioner and yet they will need to grasp the key issues across the whole panoply of issues. A substantial induction programmes will be required.
4. How might Commissioners best engage with their communities - individuals, businesses and voluntary organisations – at the neighbourhood level?
4.1 Like all public sector organisations engaging effectively with communities is a challenge. To truly be engaged with the public and to be responsive to their views a long term meaningful dialogue is required. In North Wales we have recently adopted arrangements for members of the Authority to lead on community engagement within each of our 15 policing districts. This engagement needs to be co-ordinated with partners within the area as well and delivered jointly with the local police. The public do not necessarily understand which agency leads on a particular problem and therefore joint consultation and engagement is the most effective, both in terms of cost and of avoiding confusion. There must also be a commitment to engage with all sections of the community and avoid any arrangements which tend to limit the ranges of voices heard.
4.2 It is difficult to see how a single commissioner could have the capacity for this level of involvement – let along getting involved in individual neighbourhoods. Defining neighbourhoods is notoriously difficult. The small areas used for statistical purposes are Lower Layer Super Output Areas, each having about 1,500 people. North Wales has 423 super output areas. We currently have 138 Community Beat Managers and 149.5 PCSOs. Covering all of the neighbourhoods within their patch can be challenging at times – for a single Commissioner it will be impossible
5. How can the Commissioner and the greater transparency of local information drive improvements in the most deprived and least safe neighbourhoods in their areas?
5.1 There is a temptation to adopt a cynical view that those seeking election will go to where the votes reside. We know that the more affluent are those most likely to vote and, as such, proposals as they stand tend to militate against any focus by commissioners on the more deprived areas. A way to focus attention is to publish comparative crime data between deprived and more affluent wards. This will enable pertinent questions to be asked regarding the action being taken to tackle hotspots. It must be open to the Police and Crime Panel to ask these questions: as drafted, the Commissioner could simply respond that such decisions are left to the Chief Constable’s discretion, leaving the Panel unable to get a substantive answer.
5.2 Partnership arrangements between the Commissioner and other organisations should be maintained and improved to drive longer term change in the levels of crime (see response to question 3).
6. What information would help the public make judgements about their force and Commissioner, including the level of detail and comparability with other areas?
6.1 The following information would be useful:
· Levels of crime and anti social behaviour – and perceptions
· Rates of detection for different types of crime
· Levels of public confidence/satisfaction (from the general population but also specifically victim surveys)
· Responsiveness data (call answering and attendance at incidents). A level of sophistication is required in this data: for example the public often prefer to make an appointment rather than waiting for someone to arrive
· CIPFA “value for money” data showing comparisons between forces in terms of levels of funding and how the funds are spent.
6.2 A role which should be maintained is the audit of policing crime recording data. This activity helps safeguard the reliability of what is published.
Key Proposals in Chapter 3:
- Release forces from centralised control, by removing government targets, reviewing the data burden on forces and excessive performance management –removal of the Stop form/scrapping of the policing pledge-review of RIPA/PACE
- Emphasis on what the public should see in terms of police performance that tells them what is happening
- HMIC having a role in “shining a light on police performance”-and a possible role in improving processing of cases through the CJS
- Reform of Health and Safety practices within forces to enable less risk aversion
5. Focus on also ensuring local bureaucracy is reduced-linked to greater freedom for professional judgement
Questions on Chapter 3:
7. Locally, what are examples of unnecessary bureaucracy within police forces and how can the service get rid of this?
7.1 The most obvious examples are:
· Home Office requests for information
· Freedom of Information Requests.
· Her Majesties Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) changing of actual or anticipated inspection regimes.
· Application paperwork for authorities under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA)
· Risk assessments associated with health and safety legislation.
7.2 There has been significant discussion regarding Freedom of Information legislation in the media and the burden resulting from queries. Police authorities operate on the basis of openness and accountability and enable information regarding how policing is organised to be considered in public unless there are specific reasons for confidentiality. It would be better to focus on this requirement and how it is maintained, instead of devoting significant resources to answering questions from journalists who are engaged in “fishing expeditions”. The Government should consider how to ensure that public bodies continue to work on the basis of openness and accountability (and to increase this in many cases) while reducing the burden of compliance with FOI.
8. How should forces ensure that information that local people feel is important is made available without creating a burdensome data recording process?
8.1 See question 6. We consider that the most important issue here is to establish from the public exactly what information they want and how they want it to be made available. There is already a vast range of information collected and analysed, information provided should be drawn from this and no extra burden need be, or should be created.
9. What information should HMIC use to support a more proportionate approach to their ‘public facing performance role’, while reducing burdens and avoiding de-facto targets?
9.1 Again, public consultation is crucial to ensure that HMIC focuses on what the public actually want to know, rather than what we assume the public want to know.
9.2 With the drive to reduce crime HMIC have a very clear role to play in ensuring the integrity and quality of crime recording by police forces, this links directly to consultation question 6.
9.3 The themed inspection process has proved to be of value, although we believe that recommendations made in future should be costed.
10. How can ACPO change the culture of the police service to move away from compliance with detailed guidance to the use of professional judgement within a clear framework based around outcomes?
10.1 This is not something that ACPO can achieve in isolation. IPCC, courts and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) all use policies when judging the Police Service. It is important for national guidance to build on best practice and ensure it is replicated – the alternative is the same work taking place 43 times.
10.2 The ethos of the Taylor reforms needs to be embedded within the organisational culture to give staff the confidence they need to apply their professional judgement in what are often complex and dynamic situations.
11. How can we share knowledge about policing techniques that cut crime without creating endless guidance?
11.1 The NPIA Police Online Knowledge Area (POLKA) collaboration platform is positive development.
11.2 A good example is the work we are undertaking to ensure our officers have a positive framework for dealing with low level criminality and anti social behaviour. Officers have been trained in “Value based decision making” and have welcomed the initiative – and the opportunity to use restorative resolutions in appropriate cases. We wouldn’t want to wait for the Home Office or ACPO to write guidance, but it will be appropriate for someone to review the work we have done and that underway elsewhere and for this to be available for other forces seeking to adopt a similar approach.
Key proposals in Chapter 4:
1. HMIC will play a key role in highlighting value for money issues
- There will be a full review of remuneration and conditions of service for police officers and staff
- There will be a duty upon PCCs for collaboration
- A new National Crime Agency will be formed with a border policing capability
- Increased accountability for ACPO
Questions on Chapter 4:
12. What policing functions should be delivered between forces acting collaboratively?
12.1 It must be recognised that there is a cost to collaboration in terms of additional complexity and in some cases, administration. It is important for a wide range of areas to be kept under active review – but for significant work on formal collaboration proposals to commence with developing an outline business case. If it doesn’t stack up or the savings are minimal, there is no point proceeding.
12.2 The areas where we perceive potential opportunities are as follows:
· Fleet management
· Investigation of e-crime
· Roads policing
· Information standards and compliance
· Air support
· Human resource management
· Provision of training
· Information / ICT management
· Serious and Organised crime
13. What are the principle obstacles to collaboration between forces or with other partners and how can they be addressed?
13.1 The government should take note of the HMIC report. There are a number of barriers to collaboration, including:
· Start up costs
· An understandable resistance to becoming a net benefit loser
· Geography
· Cultural issues e.g. the need for us to provide a bilingual Welsh service
· Suspicion that potential savings will be illusory
· Focus on cost not quality.
14. Are there functions which need greater national co-ordination or which would make sense to organise and run nationally (while still being delivered locally).
14.1 We believe that the following functions would benefit from greater national co-ordination:
· Ports policing
· Air Support
· Procurement
· Fleet
· Counter terrorism
· Serious and organised crime
· Air support
· Public order policing
· Firearms capability
· Scientific support
· Information technology
15. How can the police service take advantage of private sector expertise to improve value for money, for example in operational support, or back office functions shared between several forces, or with other public sector providers?
15.1 The private sector clearly has much to offer to the police service in this regard, not just in terms of opportunities for out-sourcing, but also in utilising experience and methods developed by the private sector. The QUEST methodology with Home Office sponsored assistance from KPMG is a successful example of this approach.
16. Alongside its focus on organised crime and boarder security, what functions might a new National Crime Agency deliver on behalf of police forces, and how should it be held to account?
16.1 In the first instance we consider it essential to ensure that all appropriate functions of the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA), Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and the Child Exploitation & On-line Protection Centre (CEOP) are considered, validated and taken on by the new National Crime Agency (NCA), ACPO or the Home Office as appropriate.
17. What arrangements should be in place in future to ensure that there is a sufficient pool of Chief Officers available, in particular for the most challenging leadership roles in the police service? Is there a role for other providers to provide training?
17.1 North Wales Police Authority has recently appointed new Chief Officers and throughout the process we were disappointed with the limited pool of potential candidates. The government needs to address the current limitations to becoming Chief Officers. The current system narrows the field to about the number of positions available nationally, leaving little room for police authorities to make a meaningful choice.
17.2 We recommend that the government revokes the requirement for a prospective Chief Constable to have served in another force as an ACPO rank officer in order to be acceptable as a candidate for the post. We recognise the benefits that diverse experience brings, however we believe that this should be the choice of the selection panel, rather than legislation, within the context of the application and robust assessment processes.
17.3 There is a clear role for other training providers in delivering what needs to be a mixed economy of training. Academic institutions, business schools, Civil Service Management Colleges and foreign police academies can all contribute effectively together with providers from the private sector.
18. How can we rapidly increase the capability within the police service to become more business-like, with police leaders taking on a more prominent role to help drive necessary cultural change in delivering sustainable business process improvement?
18.1 We welcome what appears to be a shift from a focus on structures to the real issue of business process and change management and would counter that this has been the focus of police leaders for some time. There is an opportunity to involve ACPO at national level to develop this issue.
18.2 There is a need to ensure that police leaders are provided with appropriate training. Existing senior leadership development programmes should be reviewed to ensure that the curriculum is relevant to the needs of senior police officers and staff in a reformed Police Service.
18.3 Whilst pointing to the unique challenges that policing presents to senior leaders we recognise the potential for benefits to be accrued through harnessing the skills of those from other sectors.
Key Proposals in Chapter 5:
1. Enabling communities to become more active around local policing / CJS and giving them the tools to do this.
- Closer and more streamlined working between the Criminal Justice System and policing.
- Cut central government targets and prescription and transfer power to local government / communities.
- Encourage mutuals, cooperatives, charities and social enterprises to drive local crime reduction initiatives.
- Introduce a new approach to rehabilitation, focused on punishment, education and change.
- Community Safety Partnerships - Remove unnecessary prescription and bureaucracy (repealing Regulations) whilst retaining core statutory duties and leave as much local freedom as possible.
- Introduction of a single national police non-emergency number ‘101’.
8. Working with the Welsh Assembly to ensure the plans align with their devolved responsibilities
Questions on Chapter 5:
19. What more can the Government do to support the public to take a more active role in keeping neighbourhoods safe?
19.1 The Special Constabulary has historically been the most obvious and productive way for members of the public to take an active role in keeping neighbourhoods safe. High turnover of membership has made the Constabulary expensive and lack of any tangible reward has rendered it difficult to affect turnout or deploy effectively.
19.2 The Special Constabulary could be developed to be one formal gateway to joining with the Police Service with members receiving accredited training in preparation for future employment. Their contribution to safer neighbourhoods in a volunteer capacity in this regard could be recognized by Government through appropriate tax allowances / concessions.
19.3 We should be careful about creating unfairness in the “market” for volunteers and avoid exaggerating the potential for direct support to the Police Service through volunteering. Greater contributions to the maintenance of order can perhaps be achieved through other voluntary work with young people in established youth organisations by involvement existing initiatives.
20. How can the Government encourage more people to volunteer (including as special constables) and provide necessary incentives to encourage them to stay?
20.1 See 19 above for comments regarding special constables.
20.2 We are of the view that the emphasis should not be on the numbers of volunteers but more on the extent and nature of volunteering offered by individuals. Volunteering costs and there is a need to ensure that the return is at least equal to this. Vetting and training are key to ensuring that we equip the right people to do the right things and this means that retention of productive volunteers is far more important than simply driving up numbers.
20.3 Again, we see a role for the Government in recognising effective contribution through appropriate tax allowances / concessions.
21. What more can central Government do to make the criminal justice system more efficient?
21.1 The victim must remain at the heart of everything we do.
21.2 We are pleased at the recent developments to return charging decisions to the police and would welcome an extension of this for all but the most serious offences.
21.3 There are opportunities to modernise the courts, specifically by having them sit at times most convenient to the victim, the public and the police. Reducing court bureaucracy by creating paper free systems would also deliver important efficiencies.
22. What prescriptions from Government get in the way of effective local partnership working?
22.1 Prescriptive funding is probably the most ineffective way to achieve locally based solutions to problems affecting our communities. Solutions need to be innovative and to be able to strike at the heart of the particular problem; partners need the flexibility with funding to be able to achieve this.
22.2 Centrally imposed targets can result in perverse outcomes and fail to reflect the needs and wants of individual communities, we welcome the drive to reduce these targets.
23. What else needs to be done to simplify and improve community safety and criminal justice work locally?
23.1 Community safety and criminal justice work is, by necessity, a team pursuit. A team approach has to be encouraged to see real improvements. This can be led from the heart of Government and the development in the relationship between the Police Minister, the Home Secretary and the Justice Secretary is an ideal platform on which to build.
There also has to be closer links between Whitehall and Cardiff where policing in Wales is concerned. The situation where the police in Wales were being measured by Whitehall on a joint performance indicator with Welsh Local Authorities that did not have the same target should not be allowed to develop again.
The response is available to download or print: Response Paper.
For the full text of the Government’s consultation document see
www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/consultations/policing-21st-century